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Abstract
We investigate a two-person random proposer bargaining game
with a deadline. A bounded time interval is divided into bargaining
periods of equal length and we study the limit of the subgame per-
fect equilibrium outcomes as the number of bargaining periods goes
to infinity while the deadline is kept fixed. This limit is close to the
discrete Raiffa solution when the time horizon is very short. If the
deadline goes to infinity the limit outcome converges to the time pref-
erence Nash solution. Regarding this limit as a bargaining solution
under deadline, we provide an axiomatic characterization.
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We investigate a two-person random proposer bargaining game with a dead-
line. A bounded time interval is divided into bargaining periods of equal
length and we study the limit of the subgame perfect equilibrium outcomes
as the number of bargaining periods goes to infinity while the deadline is kept
fixed. This limit is close to the discrete Raiffa solution (Raiffa 1951, 1953,
2002) when the time horizon is very short. If the deadline goes to infinity the
limit outcome converges to the time preference Nash solution (Chae 1993).
Our interest in finite horizon bargaining problems stems from the ob-
servation that many real situations involve fixed deadline. As an example,
consider merger negotiations between two firms before special tax benefits for
merger expires. Bargaining models with a fixed time horizon are widely used
in economic application like incomplete contract theory and search theory.
It is also of theoretical interest to study the relation between the Nash bar-
gaining solution and the equilibrium outcome of strategic bargaining models
with very little discounting.
In this paper we study first the limit of equilibrium outcomes (as the
discount factor goes to one) of a sequential bargaining game under a fixed
horizon. After that we explore a class of solutions for dynamic bargaining
situations from an axiomatic viewpoint. To do that we have to include in
definition of a bargaining problem also parameters corresponding to time
horizon and discount factor. To our knowledge, not much effort has been
devoted to include the time dimension in the axiomatic bargaining theory
(one exception being the recent paper by Diskin, Koppel, and Samet (2009)
discussed below).
The sequential bargaining game we analyze is a standard random proposer
model, and there is an important precedence of this study by Gomes, Hart,
and MasCollel (1999) (referred to as GHM below). In order to investigate
the NTU -value of a characteristic function game, they set up a sequential
bargaining game (with a probability of breakdown instead of a discount fac-
tor), and look at the limit of subgame perfect equilibrium outcomes as the
number of period tends to infinity and the breakdown probability vanishes.
They find that depending upon the way these two parameters converge, limit
outcome could be the Raiffa solution or the Nash solution, and there are bor-
derline cases where the limit outcome lies between these two solutions. The
solution studied in our paper corresponds to these borderline cases.
To characterize the limit outcome as the length of a period vanishes, we
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utilize a differential equation obtained by taking the limit process of the con-
tinuation values. There are several precursors to this approach. We make use
of the proof by Coles and Wright (1998) who study infinite horizon problem
with time dependent agreement sets. GHM also use a similar dynamic pro-
cess to characterize their solution, and they show that the process is related
to backwards induction principle. (GHM attribute this method to Maschler,
Owen, and Peleg (1988)).
It is well known that with discounting, as the deadline tends to infinity,
the subgame perfect equilibrium outcome of the random offer or alternat-
ing offer bargaining game converges to the equilibrium outcome of the cor-
responding infinite horizon game (Binmore 1985). Moreover this outcome
converges to the Nash bargaining solution as the discount factor goes to one.
All these results are established in Rubinstein (1982) and Binmore (1987).
When the deadline is kept fixed, the results change.
Following Stahl (1972), Sjostrom (1991) analyzed a game related to the
Rubinstein (1982) model. A finite time interval is divided into bargaining
periods of equal length. Sjostrom (1991) proved that without discounting,
the subgame perfect equilibrium outcomes converge to the discrete Raiffa
solution as the number of bargaining periods increases without limit. He
showed also that with very little discounting the limit outcome lies very close
to the Raiffa solution. Of course with constant non-negligible discounting this
result does not restrict the outcome much and in fact as the deadline goes
to infinity, the outcome converges to the Nash solution.
Myerson (1991, p. 393) studies a random proposer, m period bargaining
game without discounting. He finds that there is a unique subgame perfect
equilibrium for each m and that equilibrium payoffs converge to the discrete
Raiffa solution as m goes to infinity. Trockel (2011) analyzes a version of
this game such that the first proposer is chosen at random and the responder
may either accept it or else choose that they play an m period Myerson game
where m is chosen by the responder. Trockel shows that the outcome of each
weakly subgame perfect equilibrium is exactly the discrete Raiffa solution.
The discrete Raiffa solution can be obtained as the limit of the following
procedure. In the beginning, each agent demands his ”ideal point” which is
the best outcome for him satisfying individual rationality constraints. Then
the average of these two demands are given as a reference point, and players
make new demands with the constraint that nobody gets less than this ref-
erence point, and so on. The limit outcome of this procedure is the Raiffa
solution. Salonen (1988) gives an axiomatic characterization of the Raiffa so-
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lution. For more recent axiomatizations and analysis of the Raiffa solution,
see Anbarci and Sun (2009), Diskin et.al. (2009), Samet (2009) and Trockel
(2009).
A continuous version of this solution was also proposed by Raiffa and
analyzed in Peters and Van Damme(1991) (see also Livne(1989)). Diskin
et.al (2009) consider an indexed family of generalized Raiffa solutions that
converges to the continuous Raiffa solution. Each member of the family is a
pair of functions: a step function that determines a new disagreement point
to a bargaining problem and a solution function that assigns the terminal
point arrived at. In this way Diskin et.al. (2009) are able to explicitly
describe the bargaining process.
Other things that may affect the bargaining outcome except the time di-
mension are outside options. There are several papers analyzing the problem
how the outside alternatives available to the bargainers affect the outcome
of the bargaining game (see e.g. Shaked and Sutton (1984) and Binmore,
Rubinstein, and Wolinsky (1986)). These studies show that if the best alter-
native outcome is dominated by the subgame perfect equilibrium outcome,
then the best alternative has no effect on the equilibrium outcome. In these
papers it is assumed essentially that a player can end the negotiations and
take his outside alternative whenever he wants to. However, outside alter-
natives could matter if this option can be utilized only if no agreement has
been reached before a given deadline.1
The paper is organized in the following way. The strategic model is
analyzed in Section 2. Section 3 is devoted to the axiomatic approach.
2 The strategic model
The model we look at is quite similar to standard models in the literature,
see e.g. Coles and Wright (1998) where the game has infinite horizon, and
GHM where breakdown possibility with risk preference is employed with
fixed length of a period. Many of the properties we utilize are established in
these papers too.
A 0-1 normalized bargaining problem is given by a compact and convex
set S ⊂ R2+ that contains the origin. The Pareto frontier of S, PS, is given
1It should be noted that we are not dealing with the issues concerning the ”deadline
effect” (c.f. Fershtman and Seidman 1993; Roth, Murnighan and Schoumaker 1988; Ma
and Manove 1993; Simsek and Yildiz 2008).
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by y2 = F (y1) such that 1 = F (0), 0 = F (1), where F is concave, con-
tinuous, and decreasing. Further, we assume that F and F−1 are defined
and twice continuously differentiable on some open set U ⊃ [0, 1]. For a
splitting-a-dollar problem, F is generated by concave, continuous, strictly
increasing and twice continuously differentiable functions u1 and u2 on [0,1]
with ui(0) = 0 and ui(1) = 1 (i = 1, 2), such that given y1, with y1 = u1(w)
for some w ∈ [0, 1], F (y1) = u2(1 − w). The Nash solution here is given by
argmax(y1,y2)∈S y1y2 = {N
∗(S)}.
Given a deadline T > 0 and a positive integer m, let T/m = ∆m be
the length of a period. We count periods backwardly so that m is the first
period of the bargaining game. The rules of the sequential bargaining game
with a random proposer are as follows. At each period n Nature chooses a
proposer with equal probabilities. The chosen proposer makes a proposal wn
in [0, 1], and another player replies by ”Yes” or ”No”. The number wn is the
amount that player 1 would get in case of agreement and then player 2 would
get 1 − wn. If the reply is ”Yes”, then the game ends with a consequence
described by (n, wn). If the reply is ”No”, then the game moves into period
n − 1 if n > 0, or ends with payoffs (a1, a2) (evaluated at n = 0) if n = 0.
We assume that a = (a1, a2) ∈ S but unlike Sjostrom (1991), a = (0, 0) is
not required. Players maximize discounted expected utilities. The discount
rate r > 0 is common to players with the discount factor δ = δr,m = e
−r∆m .
We investigate the subgame perfect equilibrium outcome of this game.
To define this concept, we have to define strategies first. The game starts at
period m and players get their outside alternatives at the end of period 0 if
no agreement is reached prior to that.
We define first histories. Let φm = ∅, and for n = 0, . . . , m − 1 let
φn = (it, wt, ρt)mt=n+1. The sequence (i
t, wt, ρt)mt=n+1 tells what has happened
in previous periods t ∈ {m, . . . , n+1}. In period t player it was the proposer,
wt was the offer he made, and ρt = ”No” was the reply of his opponent. So
φn is the history in the beginning of period n before the proposer has been
selected. Then a period n history for the proposer in is (φn, in) and a period
n history for the responder is (φn, in, wn).
A strategy of player i ∈ {1, 2} is a mapping σi that maps each period n
history for proposer i into [0, 1] and each period n history for responder i into
{”Yes”,”No”}. A strategy profile (σ1, σ2) is a subgame perfect equilibrium if
conditional on each history, σi is optimal given σj(j 6= i). Let us characterize
now the equilibrium outcome. To do that we need to define the (discrete)
Raiffa solution with respect to outside option a = (a1, a2).
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for j = 0, 1, . . ., and
define R(S, a) = limj→∞ z
j . As noted by Sjostrom (1991), the Raiffa solution










+ a1 and similarly for
agent 2.
If agent 1 is the proposer at the 0-th period, then he makes an offer
F−1 (a2). The corresponding allocation (F
−1(a2), a2) is accepted by agent 2.
If agent 1 is the responder, then 2 makes an offer F (a1) which is accepted.
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As usual, an immediate agreement obtains and the subgame perfect equi-
librium payoffs are (zm1 , z
m
2 ). To evaluate their values in the limit as ∆m
tends to 0 we need some notation. Choose t ∈ (0, T ], and to each m let
n(m) be the integer n ∈ {m, . . . , 1} such that nT/m is closest to t. If there
are two such integers then let n(m) be the higher one. By construction
limm→∞ n(m)T/m = t. We write z(t) = limm→∞ z
n(m), if this limit exists.
Example 1. Suppose that the frontier PS is given by y1+ y2 = 1. Writ-
ing zn = (zn1 , z
n
























. Directly solving it, one obtains for i = 1, 2 that
zn+1i = z
n








+ δzni . Solving this recursive equa-









T/m = ∆m is the length of the time interval between two consecutive of-
fers. In the limit, as this time interval ∆m goes to 0, we have the outcome




N∗(S). Note that N∗(S) = (1/2, 1/2) and
R(S, a) = z0 in this case.





















in the limit. This ”current value” representation corresponds to the dif-
ferential equation given by Coles and Wright (1998). It also provides a nice
interpretation that the adjustment is made toward the ”global” Nash solu-
tion N∗(S), at a rate proportional to the difference between the current value
and Nash solution.
However the present value representation gives also a nice picture. In this
example we see that the process jumps from e−rTa to e−rTR(S, a) and from
there on it proceeds linearly to z with a direction of (1/2, 1/2).

























zn+1 − zn = (1− δ) (N∗(S)− zn) (3)
where N∗ is (a/2, b/2). End of Example 1.
The way differential equations were used in Example 1 turns out to be
very convenient in solving the general case as well. In fact Coles and Wright
(1998) utilized this approach in their analysis of general random proposer
games under non-stationary environments (see also Coles and Muthoo 2003;
McLennan 1988; Binmore 1987). We apply their result to the case with a
jump in the agreement set at the deadline. For a problem with a smooth
Pareto frontier, denote by f(y1) the derivative F
′(y1), y = (y1, y2) ∈ PS.
Formula (2) allows a specific interpretation, when we employ the notion
of a local Nash solution N(y) at a Pareto optimal point y. This solution is
found by taking the supporting hyperplane of S at y to be the Pareto frontier,
and then calculating the usual Nash solution on this plane (the disagreement












The formula (2) then becomes
zn+1 − zn = (1− δ) (N (zn)− zn) (4)
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Thus the adjustment is made toward the local Nash solution at a rate
proportional to the difference, and along the way, the local Nash solution
itself moves toward the global Nash solution. We can hope that a similar
relation holds approximately for general cases and obtain equivalent of (4)
in the limit. We may call the solution of this limit equation as the limit
solution or the limit outcome. The following theorem establishes that this
limit exists.






r(N1 (z1, F (z1))− z1)
dz1
if R(S, a) 6= N∗(S), and x = N∗(S) if R(S, a) = N∗(S).
Proof. See the Appendix.
Given the limit outcome x in Theorem 1, we describe the solution by its
inverse, i.e. as the deadline T needed to reach that particular payoff level.
For example, T = 0 if the payoff corresponds to the Raiffa solution with
respect to a. In the proof of the theorem the following lemmata are needed.
We denote by ‖·‖ the sup norm: ‖x‖ = max{|x1|, |x2|}.
Lemma 1 Given (S, a) and ε > 0, there is ∆ > 0 and n such that for
∆ < ∆, ‖R(S, a)− zn‖ < ε holds, where zn is given by equation (1).
Proof. See the Appendix.
In the following Lemma, xn (yn) is the equilibrium offer made by player
1 (player 2) in period n.
Lemma 2 Given ε > 0, there is ∆ so that if ∆ < ∆, then ‖xn − yn‖ < ε
implies ‖xn+1 − yn+1‖ < ε.
Proof. See the Appendix.
The limit outcome is located between the Nash and the Raiffa solution.
A larger T and a lower r moves the solution toward the Nash solution and
a higher ai given aj (i 6= j), shifts the Raiffa solution to the advantage of i
and hence the solution changes in the same direction.
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As mentioned above, GHM considers a sequential bargaining model with
coalition formation based on a characteristic function. In their game, a pro-
poser disappears from the bargaining table with a probability ρ ∈ (0, 1) if
his offer is rejected. In case of a pure bargaining problem, this boils down to
a sequential bargaining game with a probability of breakdown ρ, because as
soon as one player disappears from the bargaining table, the surplus to be
shared among participants evaporates.
GHM considers the limit payoff configurations of subgame perfect equi-
libria as ρ → 1, and the deadline T → ∞, while keeping the length of a
single period fixed at 1. To characterize their solution, they introduce a dy-
namic process called Consistent field dynamics C(y), a vector field defined
on the Pareto frontier. In this process, each vector y on the Pareto frontier is
adjusted toward the consistent value of the corresponding hyperplane game
determined by the supporting hyperplanes (Hart and Mas-Colell 1996). They
show that this consistent field dynamics is the derivative (times −1) of the
backward induction function with respect to ρ evaluated at ρ = 1, for each
point y on the Pareto frontier (GHM 1999, Proposition 4.1.).
The consistent field dynamics coincides with the limit dynamics we study
above, up to the parameter r. But here we let the length of a period vanish,
that is, ∆m → 0, with δ = e
−r∆m. Thus by setting ρ = e−h∆m where h is an
instantaneous rate of breakdown, one sees that changing ρ plays the same
role as changing ∆m. By differentiaiting ρ with respect to ∆m at ∆m = 0,
their Proposition 4.1 yields that −C(y) equals −h times the time derivative
of the backward induction function.
GHM’s main interest lies in the case when T → ∞ faster than ρ → 1
(or, when ρT → 0), in which case one obtains the Nash solution in the limit.
However, they also note that if ρT → 1, then the limit is the Raiffa solution,
and in Theorem 4.4 (i) they show that if ρT → µ > 0, then the limit can be
given by the Consistent field dynamics in the following manner.
Let Λq(y) represent the point reached after duration q when the process
starts at y, with dΛq(y)
dt
= C(Λq(y)), in a consistent field dynamics. Then
the limit point is given by Λ− log µ(R(S, a)). Note that when ρ = e
−hT/M ,
then ρM = e−hT does not depend on M and e−hT corresponds to the term
µ in GHM’s Theorem 4.4 (i). (Note that r is a parameter depending upon
preferences, while h is exogenously given.) In this sense the limit outcome
of our finite horizon game corresponds to the case of GHM explained above.
Although these are two different approaches, they both yield a similar formula
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for the solution.
Studying finite horizon problems is of interest in itself, and here we con-
centrate in this particular case (which GHM does not discuss after Theorem
4.4). The solution in this case depends on the initial point, the Raiffa solu-
tion, and the length of time horizon which may indicate that these parameters
have some importance in applications as well. This structure of the solution
motivates us to study axiomatically a wider class of solutions.
Example 2. For some cases, one can compute the the limit outcome
explicitly. Let u1(w) = w
α and u2(w) = w
β with 0 < α, β ≤ 1 where w is
the amount of money in the ”divide-a-dollar” problem (these functions are
not C1 at the boundary, and so a is restricted to the interior of S). Then





α/β − (1 + α/β)u1/(α−1)
so that





α/β − (1 + α/β)x
1/α
1













A change in the bargaining protocol affects the limit outcome, especially
through the change in the limit outcome as T goes to zero. A sequential
bargaining game with player i having the last say yields an outcome given
by the same formula except that the lower limit of the integral replaced by
the i -th coordinate of the i’s dictatorial solution instead of that of the Raiffa
solution. Under the random proposer protocol with unequal probabilities,
the solution is modified according to these probabilities. The Raiffa solution
is changed so that the speed of adjustment in the integral is modified, and
the local and global Nash solutions are replaced by the asymmetric Nash
solutions with the weights given by these probabilities.
3 The axiomatic model
The solution given in Theorem 1 is a compound of three elements: 1) the
solution reached at the end phase (or the limit when T goes to zero); 2)
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the local adjustment direction for intermediate values of T ; and 3) the limit
when T goes to infinity. The particular solutions corresponding to these parts
are: 1) the Raiffa solution with respect to the outside alternative; 2) the local
Nash solution at each point on the boundary; and 3) the global Nash solution.
This motivates us to investigate the relationships between solutions obtained
by other possible mixtures of these three elements. For example, the Nash
solution is popular for finite horizon problems with outside alternatives, and
one may want to construct a strategic model that yields the Nash solution
as an equilibrium outcome. The result of the previous section reveals that
this might not be an easy task. However, one can still study what kind of
axioms are needed to single out the Nash solution for this class of problems.
The class of problems we consider is Ψ = {B = (S, a, r, T ) | S ⊂ R2+, a ∈
S, and T > 0, r > 0}, where S is a compact, convex and comprehensive sub-
set of R2 such that weakly Pareto optimal elements are Pareto optimal. Thus
the class is slightly larger than the one we worked on earlier, where in order to
utilize Coles and Wright (1998) result, we assumed smooth Pareto frontiers.
Extending the solution given by Theorem 1 to this class is straightforward
because the function representing the Pareto frontier of S is differentiable
a.e., for all (S, a, r, T ) ∈ Ψ, and so the integral defining the solution is still
well defined. For a later use, we denote by Γ the set of pairs (S, a) such that
B = (S, a, r, T ) ∈ Ψ, for some r, T > 0.
We extend the definition of the ”derivative” f of the Pareto boundary
function F by first defining f(z1) = F
′(z1) if F is differentiable at z1. For
other values of z1 we proceed as follows. Denote by D the set of all points z1




1 ↑ z1, z
′
1 ∈ D} if
z1 < N
∗




1 ↓ z1, z
′
1 ∈ D} if z1 > N
∗
1 (S); and let f(z1)
be such that N(z1, F (z1)) = N
∗(S) if z1 = N
∗
1 (S) (recall that N(z1, F (z1))
is the local Nash solution at (z1, F (z1)).
A solution ϕ to bargaining problems in Ψ maps each B = (S, a, r, T ) ∈ Ψ
to an element of S. We want to axiomatize the solution that selects the limit
outcome x given in Theorem 1. Let us denote this particular solution by ϕ∗.
Consider the following standard properties for solutions on Ψ.
Efficiency (E). ϕ(B) ∈ PS, for all B ∈ Ψ.
Given α ∈ R2++, denote αx = (α1x1, α2x2) for all x ∈ R
2. The mapping
α defined by x −→ αx is called a (positive) scale transformation. Given
X ⊂ R2, let αX = {αx | x ∈ X}. Given B = (S, a, r, T ) ∈ Ψ, denote
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αB = (αS, αa, r, T ).
Scale Invariance (SI). ϕ(αB) = αϕ(B) for each problem B ∈ Ψ, and
for any positive scale transformation α.
We use the Hausdorff metric on compact subsets of R2+ for measur-
ing the distance between subsets S and S ′ of bargaining problems B =
(S, a, r, T ), B′ = (S ′, a′, r′, T ′) ∈ Ψ. The metric on Ψ is the sup -metric
applied to the four ”coordinates” S, a, r, T of problems B ∈ Ψ.
Continuity (Cont). ϕ is continuous on Ψ.
Denote
G(S, a, r) = lim
T→0
ϕ(S, a, r, T ) ∈ S (5)
when the right hand side exists. We call G(S, a, r) the end phase eval-
uation of (S, a, r, T ). By this concept, we try to pin down the bargaining
outcome when there is only very little time to bargain. Indeed, continuity
implies that the solution in this case is almost G(S, a, r).
If G(S, a, r) does not depend on r, then the effect of an outside alternative
a is totally captured by G, because if two problems share the same future
outcomes, then the bargaining outcome today must be the same. Finally,
note that combined with the earlier properties, G should be a continuous,
efficient, and scale invariant function of (S, a, r).
Time Decomposability (TD). Let B = (S, a, r, T ) and B′ = (S, a, r, T ′)
with T > T ′. Then ϕ(B) = ϕ(S, ϕ(B′), r, T − T ′).
TD states that the solution is decomposable along the time dimension.
The problems B and B′ are otherwise the same except that in B there is
more time to bargain (T > T ′). Then players could solve B′ first, and use
it’s solution as an outside alternative in the new problem where the deadline
is at T − T ′.
We are now ready to prove that the end phase evaluation G(S, a, r) exists
for every (S, a, r, T ) ∈ Ψ, i.e., the limit (5) exists given our axioms. The next
Lemma is actually a bit stronger result that will also be used in the proof of
Theorem 2 below. We show that ϕi(S, a, r, T ) is either a constant function of
T , or a strictly monotone function of T , or strictly monotone for small values
of T and constant elsewhere. Strict monotonicity means that ϕi(S, a, r, T ) is
either strictly increasing or strictly decreasing in T .
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Lemma 3 Suppose ϕ satisfies E, Cont and TD. Then for each problem
B = (S, a, r, T ), ϕi(S, a, r, T ) is either (i) a constant function of T ; or (ii)
a strictly monotone function of T ; or (iii) there is a T ∗ > 0 such that ϕ
a strictly monotone function of T on (0, T ∗] and a constant function on
(T ∗,∞).
Proof. See the Appendix.
Corollary 1 Suppose ϕ satisfies E, Cont and TD. Then the end phase
evaluation G(S, a, r) given by (5) exists for all bargaining problems B =
(S, a, r, T ) ∈ Ψ.
Proof. By Lemma 3, the limit G(S, a, r) defined in equation (5) exists.
By this Corollary, we can extend our class of games Ψ to the class Ψ¯ that
contains also problems B = (S, a, r, T ) with T = 0, with the understanding
that T = 0 does not imply deadline is immediate, but rather this represents
the limit of positive deadline cases. By Corollary 1, we can extend any
solution ϕ on Ψ satisfying E, Cont and TD to a solution ϕ¯ on Ψ¯ satisfying
these same axioms. However, in order to keep notation simpler, we use the
old notation for solutions and the class of problems. Note that the end phase
evaluation G is related to ϕ by ϕ(B) = G(S, a, r) for all B = (S, a, r, 0) ∈ Ψ.
Next we modify the independence of irrelevant alternatives axiom (IIA)
to our dynamic setting.
Time Path IIA (TPIIA). Let B = (S, a, r, T ) ∈ Ψ and B′ = (S ′, a, r, T )
∈ Ψ be such that S ′ ⊂ S and ϕ(S, a, r, 0) = ϕ(S ′, a, r, 0). If for all T ′, 0 <
T ′ ≤ T , ϕ(S, a, r, T ′) ∈ S ′, then ϕ(B) = ϕ(B′).
This property reflects the backward induction principle, and so the justi-
fication of our IIA property in the dynamic setting may be more palatable
than the justification of the ordinary IIA in static framework.
Next we formulate a symmetry property in our dynamic context. Let pˆi
be the nontrivial permutation on {1, 2}, i.e., pˆi(i) = j, i 6= j. The induced
permutation on R2 is denoted by pi so that pi(x1, x2) = (x2, x1) for any
(x1,x2) ∈ R
2. An element x ∈ R2 is symmetric if pi(x1, x2) = (x1, x2), and
a set S ⊂ R2 is symmetric if pi(S) = {pi(x) | x ∈ S} satisfies pi(S) = S.
A subset S ⊂ R2 is symmetric relative to y ∈ R2, if S − y is symmetric.
If a singleton set {x} is symmetric relative to y, we may say simply that
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x is symmetric relative to y. For any B = (S, a, r, T ) and b ∈ S, define
S(b) = S ∩ {x ∈ R2+ | x ≥ b}.
Dynamic Symmetry (DS). Given B = (S, a, r, T ) ∈ Ψ, suppose that
for all t ∈ (0, T ], S(e−rta) is symmetric relative to e−rTa. Then ϕ(B) is
symmetric relative to e−rTa.
This requirement says that if the ”individually rational” part S(e−rTa)
of the problem B is symmetric relative to e−rTa, the the solution must be
symmetric relative to e−rTa. The precondition in DS is rather demanding,
but when it is satisfied this axiom becomes very stringent. In fact DS can
be applied only to problems with a linear Pareto frontier unless a1 = a2.
Given a problem (S, a) ∈ Γ, the ideal point M(S, a) ∈ R2+ of (S, a) is
defined byMi(S, a) = max {yi | y ∈ S, y ≥ a} , i = 1, 2.We have the following
lemma.
Lemma 4 Suppose ϕ is a solution on Ψ satisfying E, SI, Cont, TD and
DS. If B = (S, a, r, 0) ∈ Ψ is such that the Pareto set above a is a
straight line segment between (M1(S, a), a2) and (a1,M2(S, a)), then ϕ(B) =
G(S, a, r) is the midpoint of this segment independently of r.
Proof. See the Appendix.
Lemma 4 gives sufficient conditions such that if B = (S, a, r, T ) is a
problem such that the Pareto frontier above a is a straigth line segment, then
ϕ(B) is the midpoint of this line independently of r. Now any symmetric,
efficient and scale invariant bargaining solution on problems (S, a) ∈ Γ has
this property.
Here is our second main result.
Theorem 2 Suppose that ϕ satisfies E, SI, Cont, DS, TPIIA and TD on
the class Ψ of games. Let B = (S, a, r, T ) ∈ Ψ and let ϕ(S, a, r, 0) = (y1, y2).





r{N1(z1, F (z1))− z1}
dz1, (6)
if y 6= N∗(S),and ϕ(S, a, r, T ) = y, if y = N∗(S). Further, the end phase
evaluation ϕ(S, a, r, 0) = y is independent of r.
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Proof. See the Appendix.
By setting y = R(S, a) in Theorem 2, we see that the limit solution ϕ∗
satisfies the axioms listed in Theorem 2. The following proposition holds as
well.
Proposition 1 The axioms in Theorem 2 are independent.
Proof. See the Appendix.
In the first part of the paper we noted that if in every bargaining period
both players have the same probability of being selected as the proposer, then
the ”end phase evaluation” would be the Raiffa solution. If the proposer is
selected in a different way, then also this solution could change. For example,
in the alternating move version of the strategic game, a dictatorial solution
would be the end phase evaluation. However, we give here an axiom such that
the Raiffa solution results. Consider the following axiom which is adapted
from Salonen (1988).
Weak Decomposability (WD). Let B = (S, a, r, 0), B′ = (S ′, a, r, 0) ∈
Ψ be any two problems such that S ′ ⊂ S and M(S, a) = M(S ′, a). Then
there is a problem B′′ = (S ′′, a, r, 0) with M(S ′′, a) = M(S, a) and ϕ(B′′) = b
such that ϕ(B) = ϕ(S, b, r, 0) and ϕ(B′) = ϕ(S ′, b, r, 0).
This property says that given any two problems with the same outside
alternatives and ideal points, one can find a third problem with the same
ideal point and outside option in such a way that the solution of the third
problem can be used as a new outside option for the first two problems
without changing their solution.
Theorem 3 Let ϕ be a solution on Ψ satisfying E, SI, Cont, DS and WD.
Then for any B = (S, a, r, T ) ∈ Ψ, ϕ(S, a, r, 0) = R(S, a), that is, the end
phase evaluation is the Raiffa solution R.
Proof. See the Appendix.
We noted earlier that if we set y = R(S, a) in equation (6), then we get
the limit solution ϕ∗. Hence Theorems 2 and 3 imply the following.
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Corollary 2 The limit solution ϕ∗ is the only solution on Ψ satisfying ax-
ioms E, SI, Cont, DS, TPIIA, TD and WD.
It is easy to show that WD is independent of the other axioms.
We can axiomatize asymmetric versions of ϕ as well. Given the problems
B = (S, a, r, T ) and B′ = (S, a′, r, T ) we say that B′ is congruent to B, if
there is real number q > 0 such that S(a)−a = q(S(a′)−a′). The real number
q is called the scaling factor. Take first the individually rational parts of B
and B′ and translate them so that the least allocation is at the origin. If
these sets are related to each other by common scale transformation, then
the problems are congruent. Consider the following axiom.
Congruence (C). Suppose all problems Bt = (S, e−rta, r, 0) are con-
gruent to B = (S, a, r, 0), and q(t) is the scaling factor, t ∈ (0, T ]. Then
ϕ(B)− a = q(t)(ϕ(Bt)− e−rta).
The solutions of congruent problems B and Bt are related by the same
linear mappings that establishes the congruence.
An asymmetric global Nash solution N∗β selects from each feasible set
S the point that maximizes the product xβ1x
1−β , 0 ≤ β ≤ 1. Similarly,
an asymmetric local Nash solution Nβ at z is defined in the same way as
the (symmetric) local Nash solution, except that players have weights β and
1 − β in the Nash product. Finally, an asymmetric Raiffa solution Rβ of a
problem (S, a) is defined as the limit point of the sequence {ak}∞k=0, where
ak+1 = β(M1(S, a
k), ak2) + (1− β)(a
k
1,M2(S, a
k), and a0 = a.
One can show that if the axiom DS is replaced by the axiom C, then
Theorem 2 would hold for a solution ϕβ when the global and local Nash
solutions are replaced by asymmetric solutions N∗β and Nβ , respectively.
Further, with the same replacements, Theorem 3 would hold for the asym-
metric Raiffa solution Rβ. If in the strategic bargaining game player 1 is
chosen as the proposer with probability β, then the equilibrium outcome
would be given by ϕβ.
We omit detailed proofs because they are simple adaptations of the proofs
of Theorems 1 - 3. It suffices to note that when the Pareto frontier of B =
(S, a, r, T ) is either linear or piecewise linear with only one kink which is
proportional to a, then C can be applied and it can be shown that, given the
axioms, the weight β must be the same for all such problems.
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4 Concluding comments
We have set out a framework in which parameters representing the dynamic
structure of bargaining problems are included in the model and we have
characterized a family of solutions axiomatically, in particular the one cor-
responding to the limit solution of sequential bargaining game with equal
recognition probabilities. Like other solutions in the literature, we believe
that there are many different ways to characterize these and possibly other,
related solutions. Especially the dynamic symmetry axiom we utilized is
quite specific and it might be useful to formulate some substitutes for it.
Among possible extensions, one could e.g. increase the number of players.
This extension seems rather straightforward, except that the formula repre-
senting the solution in two-person problems may not be available for higher
dimensions. Another point that may be worth of more careful investigation
is how the ”end phase ”evaluation” changes under different bargaining proto-
cols and how it affects the solution when there is still time to bargain. That
might enlarge the set of potential applications of the model.
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Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1. We first give names to the mappings defining vectors




−1(z2), z2 + F (z1)) , G(z) = G0(δz).
Define also Gn0 = G0 ◦ G
n−1
0 and G
n = G ◦ Gn−1 for n = 1, 2, . . ., where
G10 = G0 and G




As δ tends to 1, G tends to G0. Therefore G
n
0 (z) tends to G
n(z) given n and
z. Thus given ε > 0, there is ∆m and n so that ‖G
n
0 (z) − R(S, a)‖ < ε/2
and ‖Gn(z)−Gn0 (z)‖ < ε/2. Since G
n(z) = zn, we have ‖R(S, a)− zn‖ < ε,
as desired.
Proof of Lemma 2. Let us start by proving the following claim.
Claim. Given ε > 0, there is ∆ so that if ∆ < ∆, then it holds that if
δzn is ε -close to PS, then δzn+1 is ε -close to PS.
The proof of the Claim. Let Bε(PS) be an open ε -neighbourhood of the
Pareto set PS of S such that (0, 0) /∈ Bε(PS). Let S
′ = S \ Bε(PS). Then
S ′ is a nonempty compact and convex subset of S such that the distance
between x and PS is ε, for every x ∈ PS ′.






−1(z2), z2 + F (z1)
)
.
Choose ∆ > 0 so small that δG0(z) ∈ Bε(PS) for every z ∈ cl[S \ S
′], where
δ corresponds to ∆, for any ∆ < ∆.
To see that such a ∆ exists, note first that δG0(z) is a continuous function
of δ and z on a compact set [0, 1]× cl[S \S ′]. Clearly δG0(z) ∈ Bε(PS) holds
when δ = 1. Define
δ = inf{δ ∈ [0, 1] | δG0(z) ∈ Bε(PS), z ∈ cl[S \ S
′]}.
If δ = 1, then for any δ ∈ (0, 1) there is a sequence {xn} such that δG0(x
n) /∈
Bε(PS), for all n. Since cl[S \ S
′] is compact, the sequence {xn} has a
convergent subsequence and w.l.o.g. we may assume that the sequence itself
converges to x ∈ cl[S \ S ′].Then by continuity δG0(x) /∈ Bε(PS). But then
x /∈ cl[S \ S ′], since x < G0(x) for every x ∈ S \ PS, and δx = δG0(x) ∈
Bε(PS) for some δ < 1 when x ∈ PS. Hence δ < 1, and we may set ∆ to
correspond δ.
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Suppose zn is computed as in equation (1). If δzn ∈ Bε(PS), then by
construction δG0(δz
n) ∈ Bε(PS). Since δG0(δz
n) = δzn+1, we are done.
End of the proof of the Claim.
The offers in period n+ 1 are
xn+1 = (F−1(δzn2 ), δz
n
2 ) and y
n+1 = (δzn1 , F (δz
n
1 )).
The sup -distance between xn+1 and yn+1 is
ds(x
n+1, yn+1) = max{F−1(δzn2 )− δz
n





The sup -distance between δzn and the Pareto frontier PS is
ds(δz
n, PS) = d such that δzn + (d, d) ∈ PS.
Note that ds(x
n+1, yn+1) ≤ ds(δz
n, PS). By the Claim, there is ∆ so that
if ∆ < ∆, then it holds that if δzn is ε -close to PS, then δzn+1 is ε -close
to PS. But for this ∆ also ds(x
n+1, yn+1) < ε and ds(x
n+2, yn+2) < ε so we
are done.
Proof of Theorem 1. Note that if R(S, a) = N∗(S), then zn+1 − zn = 0





r[N1(z1(t), F (z1(t)))− z1(t)]dt+R1(S, a)
holds is equivalent to prove the theorem.
Given ε > 0 and n, there is by Lemma 1 ∆
′
such that zn is ε-close to
R(S, a), when ∆ < ∆
′
. By Lemma 2, we can choose ∆ ≤ ∆
′
so that if zn is
ε-close to PS, and hence the offers xn+1and yn+1 are ε-close to each other,




are ε-close to each other, for all n′ = n + 1. Thus
Lemmata 1 and 2 in Coles and Wright (1998) hold and the proof of their
Theorem 1 applies.
In their Theorem 1, Coles and Wright (1998) show that for the infinite
horizon version of this game, the backward induction process satisfies (in the













(the sign here is negative since we count time backwards). Recall that
q is player 1’s monetary gain, player 2 obtains 1 − q, and ui is player i’s
utility (i = 1, 2) with du2(1−q)
dq
= −u′2. Noting that y1 = u1, F (y1) = u2, and












F (y1)/f(y1) + y1
}
= r[y1 −N1(y)].
The rest of the proof is like in the proof of Theorem 1 by Coles and Wright
(1998), and the details are omitted here.
Proof of Lemma 3. We show first (Step 1 ) that if ϕ is a constant function
of T on some nonempty interval (T1, T2), then ϕ is a constant function of T
on (T1,∞). In this case there exists a least value T
∗ such that ϕ is constant
on (T ∗,∞). In Step 2 we show that if T ∗ > 0 then ϕ is strictly monotone
on (0, T ∗]. If ϕ is not constant on any nonempty interval (T1, T2), then ϕ is
a strictly monotone function of T on (0,∞).
Step 1. Suppose that ϕ is constant on some (T1, T2), T1 < T2, but not
everywhere on (T1,∞). Then by Cont, there exists a largest T denoted by
T¯ such that ϕ is constant on (T1, T¯ ). Take any δ > 0, δ < T¯ − T1 such that
ϕ(S, a, r, T¯ ) = x 6= y = ϕ(S, a, r, T¯ + δ). By assumption ϕ(S, a, r, T¯ − δ) = x.
By TD, ϕ(S, a, r, T¯ ) = ϕ(S, x, r, T¯ − (T¯ − δ)) = ϕ(S, x, r, δ) = x. But
TD implies also that ϕ(S, a, r, T¯ + δ) = y = ϕ(S, x, r, T¯ + δ − T¯ ) = x, a
contradiction. Hence ϕ must be a constant function of T on (T1,∞). By
Cont, there exists a least value T ∗ such that ϕ is constant on (T ∗,∞).
Step 2. If T ∗ > 0, we want to show that ϕ is a strictly monotone function
of T on (0, T ∗]. Assume to the contrary that ϕ(S, a, r, T1) = ϕ(S, a, r, T2)
for some T1, T2, 0 < T1 < T2 ≤ T
∗. For each ε > 0 there is t ∈ (T2 − ε, T2)
such that ϕ(S, a, r, t) 6= ϕ(S, a, r, T2). This follows by Cont because ϕ is not
constant on (T2 − ε, T2) by Step 1.
As a continuous function ϕ1 achieves a maximum and a minimum value
on [T1, T2]. Either the maximum or the minimum value must be different
than the value ϕ1 gets at T1 and T2. Suppose w.l.o.g. that t
′ is a maximizer
and ϕ(S, a, r, t′) > ϕ(S, a, r, T1) = ϕ(S, a, r, T2). Let ε be such that 2ε =
ϕ(S, a, r, t′)−ϕ(S, a, r, T1). By Cont, there is a least number σ > 0 such that
ϕ1(S, a, r, t
′ − σ) = ϕ1(S, a, r, t
′)− ε,
and
ϕ1(S, a, r, t
′ − σ) < ϕ1(S, a, r, t)
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holds for all t ∈ (t′ − σ, t′]. By Cont, there exists a greatest number σ′ > 0,
σ′ < T2 − t
′ such that
ϕ1(S, a, r, t
′ + σ′) = ϕ1(S, a, r, t
′)− ε,
and
ϕ1(S, a, r, t
′ + σ′) > ϕ1(S, a, r, t)
holds for all t ∈ [t′ + σ′, T2].
Take δ > 0 such that t′ − σ + δ < t′ and t′ + σ′ + δ < T2, and let
x = ϕ(S, a, r, t′ − σ). Then by TD, ϕ(S, a, r, t′ − σ + δ) = ϕ(S, x, r, δ), and
ϕ1(S, x, r, δ) > x1 by the choice of δ and σ. On the other hand, TD implies
that ϕ(S, a, r, t′ + σ′ + δ) = ϕ(S, x, r, δ), and ϕ1(S, x, r, δ) < x1 by the choice
of δ and σ′. This is a contradiction and hence ϕ(S, a, r, T1) = ϕ(S, a, r, T2)
cannot hold. But then ϕ must be a strictly monotone function on (0, T ∗].
If ϕ is not a constant function of T on any nonempty open interval then
the argument above shows that ϕ(S, a, r, T1) = ϕ(S, a, r, T2) cannot hold for
any T1 6= T2 and hence ϕ must be strictly monotone on (0,∞).
Proof of Lemma 4. Suppose first that ai > 0, i = 1, 2. Make positive scale
transformations to the feasible set S and the outside option a such that for the
resulting pair (S ′, a′) it holds that M1(S




the transformed game by B′ = (S ′, a′, 0, r), and note that by SI, the solution
ϕ(B′) is obtained from ϕ(B) by applying the same scale transformation that
was applied to B.
Now S ′ ∩ {x ∈ R2+ | x ≥ a
′} is symmetric relative to e−rTa′, since T = 0.
Then by DS the solution ϕ(B′) is symmetric relative to a′. But this means
that ϕ1(B
′)− a′1 = ϕ2(B
′)− a′2, so ϕ(B
′) is the midpoint of the line segment
above a′ that consists of all Pareto optimal points that are above a′. Since S
and a do not depend on r, the result holds independently of r. When ai > 0,
the result follows by applying SI. When a1 = 0 or a2 = 0, the result follows
by applying Cont.
Proof of Theorem 2. If ϕ is a constant function of T at B = (S, a, r, T ),
then the claim clearly holds. Suppose therefore in the remaining proof that
ϕ is not a constant function of T , and recall that by Lemma 3 that ϕ is then
a strictly monotone function of T on (0, T ∗) (not excluding the possibility
T ∗ =∞) and constant elsewhere.
Suppose first that the Pareto frontier of B = (S, a, r, T ) is a straight line
segment with a slope −1. Then the local Nash solution N(z1, F (z1)) at z
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is the global Nash solution N∗(S). If y = N∗(S), then DS implies that
ϕ(B) = N∗(S). If y 6= N∗(S) then formula (6) holds for ϕ by Theorem 1.
To see this, note first that axioms E and DS imply in this special case
that ϕ(S, a, r, 0) = y is the standard symmetric and efficient solution which
coincides with the Raiffa solution R(S, a). Secondly, note that we may as-
sume that w1 + w2 = 1 holds for Pareto optimal points w, so we have that
N(z1, F (z1)) = N
∗(S) = (1/2, 1/2). In Example 1 we calculated explic-
itly that the (first coordinate of the) limit solution in this case is given by
x1 = e
−rTy1+(1−e
−rT )(1/2). It suffices to show that formula (6) is satisfied.





r{N1(z1, F (z1))− z1}
dz1,
we get that rT = − ln (1/2− x1) + ln (1/2 + y1), since N1(z1, F (z1)) = 1/2.
From this we get easily the correct result x1 = e
−rTy1 + (1− e
−rT )(1/2).
If y = N∗(S), then DS implies that ϕ(B) = N∗(S). If the Pareto frontier
is linear but has a different slope than −1, the result follows from SI. Note
that the end phase evaluation ϕ(S, a, r, 0) = y does not depend on r and that
ϕ is a strictly monotone function of T .
Suppose then that the Pareto frontier of B = (S, a, r, T ) is piecewise
linear. If ϕ(B) and ϕ(S, a, r, 0) = y are on the same line segment, then the
result follows from the first part of the proof by TPIIA. Assume next that
ϕ(B) and ϕ(S, a, r, 0) = y are on the adjacent line segments LB and L0 such
that ϕ(B) ∈ LB \ L0 and y ∈ L0 \ LB. To help to visualize the situation, we
may assume ϕ1(B) < y1.
Then by Cont, we can select T ′ < T in such a way that (i) ϕ(S, a, r, T ′) =
x is the corner connecting LB and L0. Then by TD, ϕ(S, x, r, T − T
′) =
ϕ(S, a, r, T ). Note that if T ∗ < ∞, then T ′ < T ∗ (since ϕ(B) 6= x) and
ϕ is strictly monotone on (0, T ∗]. If T ∗ = ∞ then of course ϕ is strictly
monotone.
Since ϕ is strictly monotone on (0, T ∗] and T ′ < T ∗, T ′ is the unique
t < T such that ϕ(S, a, r, t) = x. Furthermore by strict monotonicity of ϕ,
ϕ(S, x, r, t) 6= x and ϕ(S, x, r, t) lies between x and ϕ(B) on the line segment
LB when 0 ≤ t < T − T
′.
By TPIIA, ϕ(S, x, r, t) is the same as ϕ(S ′, x, r, t) for 0 ≤ t < T − T ′
where the Pareto set of S ′ is the straight line segment LB ∩ R
2
+. By Cont,
this holds also for t = T − T ′.
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By TPIIA, ϕ(S, y, r, t) = ϕ(S ′′, y, r, t) for 0 ≤ t < T ′ where the Pareto
set of S ′′ is the straight line segment L0 ∩ R
2
+. By Cont, the equality holds
also for t = T ′. But since ϕ(S, a, r, t) = ϕ(S, y, r, t) holds always when
y = ϕ(S, a, r, 0) by Cont and TPIIA, this implies that ϕ(S, a, r, t) is strictly
monotone on (0, T ′] and hence on (0, T ].
In the first part of this proof we showed that formula (6) holds for
problems with a linear Pareto frontier. Hence formula (6) holds for ϕ at
(S, a, r, T ′) and (S, x, r, T − T ′) and the end phase evaluations ϕ(S, a, r, 0)
and ϕ(S, x, r, 0) of these problems are independent of r. Since integration is
additive with respect to an integration limit, the result holds. If ϕ(B) and
ϕ(S, a, r, 0) = y are not located on adjacent linear segments of a piecewise
linear Pareto frontier, then apply induction on the number of corners of line
segments between ϕ(B) and ϕ(S, a, r, 0) = y.
To any problem B = (S, a, r, T ) there is a sequence {Bn}
∞
n=0 of problems
having piecewise linear Pareto frontiers converging to B. The result follows
the from the previous paragraph by Cont.
Proof of Proposition 1. We drop one axiom at a time from Theorem
2 and give a solution that does not satisfy the specifications given in that
theorem. Details are left to the reader.
If E is not required, define ϕ(S, a, T, r) = ae−rT .
If SI is not required, consider the Egalitarian solution w.r.t. a. That is,
ϕ(S, a, T, r) = x ∈ PS such that x1 − a1 = x2 − a2.
If DS is not required, define ϕ(S, a, T, r) = (a1, F (a1)).
If TD is not required, then let ϕ(S, a, T, r) be the usual Nash solution of
the problem (S, e−rTa), i.e., S is the set of utility allocations and e−rTa is
the threat point.
If Cont is not required, then construct a solution as follows. Let ϕ(S, a, 0, r) =
R(S, a). If T > 0, and the Pareto frontier PS is linear in some open neigh-
bourhood around R(S, a), then compute ϕ(S, a, T, r) as in Theorem 2 as long
as ϕ(S, a, T, r) is on the same linear segment as R(S, a). If for some T the so-
lution ϕ(S, a, T, r) hits an endpoint of the linear segment containing R(S, a),
let ϕ(S, a, T ′, r) be equal to that endpoint for all T ′ > T . If R(S, a) is not on
a linear segment, then let ϕ(S, a, T, r) = R(S, a).
If TPIIA is not required, replace the local Nash solution in the differ-
ential equation (6) by the ”local Raiffa solution” Rl(z) which is defined as
follows. As before, F denotes the function z2 = F (z1) describing the Pareto
frontier and R(S, (0, 0)) is the usual Raiffa solution of the bargaining problem
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(S, (0, 0)). To each point z on the Pareto frontier of the utility set S choose
a supporting hyperplane H(z) at z that has the slope equal to a) the right
hand side derivative of F at z1 if z1 < R1(S, (0, 0)); b) the left hand side
derivative of F at z1 if z1 > R1(S, (0, 0)); c) the average of the left and right
hand side derivatives at z1 if z = R(S, (0, 0)). Let R
l(z) be the orthogonal
projection of R(S, (0, 0)) on the plane H(z). Replacing the local Nash solu-
tion in equation (6) by the local Raiffa solution gives a solution ϕ on Ψ that
satisfies all the other axioms of Theorem 2 except TPIIA
Proof of Theorem 3. Take any B = (S, a0, r, T ) ∈ Ψ, and let B′ =
(S ′, a0, r, T ) ∈ Ψ be such that S ′ ⊂ S, M(S, a0) = M(S ′, a0) and the Pareto
set of B′ above the point a0 is a straight line segment. Let the midpoint of
this line segment be a1, so by Lemma 4, ϕ(S ′, a0, r, 0) = a1. By Lemma 4
and WD, ϕ(S, a0, r, 0) = ϕ(S, a1, r, 0), for all r.
Suppose that ak has been defined, ak ≥ ak−1 and that ϕ(S, a0, r, 0) =
ϕ(S, ak, r, 0), for k ≥ 1 and independently of r. Let ak+1 be the midpoint of
the line segment between the points (M1(S, a




ak+1 ≥ ak and by WD and Lemma 4, ϕ(S, a0, r, 0) = ϕ(S, ak+1, r, 0) inde-
pendently of r. Then it follows easily that {ak}k≥0 is an increasing sequence
in S converging to the discrete Raiffa solution R(S, a0). By construction,
ϕ(S, a0, r, 0) = R(S, a0) independently of r.
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